

Obs

Observatori de Política Exterior Europea



Working Paper n. 87

June 2012

EU “actorness” in International Relations: The Non-Proliferation Policy of the EU in the Southern Mediterranean

Peyami Kalyoncu

Chief of Section, Maritime Affairs Department , Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey

The starting point of this research is a widely used rhetoric that the EU is a global actor. In view of this, EU's non-proliferation policy in the southern Mediterranean is examined. The study is conducted on the basis of the conceptualization of EU “actorness” and through some criteria (external context, developments in the EU foreign policy apparatus, EU's self-presentation and third party perceptions, consistency and availability of policy instruments and concrete actions) that involve both ideational and material factors, in accordance with “methodological pluralism”. This conceptual framework helped assess EU's non-proliferation policy in this particular region where the EU has interests and good reasons to act. Each of the criteria demonstrated the pros and cons of EU “actorness” on this selected field and case. This paper contends that non-proliferation “actorness” of the EU in the southern Mediterranean region has remained limited due to a variety of reasons.

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Edifici E-1
08193 Bellaterra
Barcelona (Espanya)

Kalyoncu, Peyami “EU “actorness” in International Relations: The Non-Proliferation Policy of the EU in the Southern Mediterranean”, *Working Paper del Observatori de Política Exterior Europea*, n. 87, June 2012, Bellaterra (Barcelona): Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus

Introduction*

The ambitious project of constructing an area of enduring peace, stability and welfare at a continent where two devastating wars of 20th century started and fought has been thoroughly analysed and studied at all levels. Understanding the external impact or the foreign policy of the European Union (EU) ^[1] has been one of the issues that attracted vast amount of interest. One main concern has been the conceptualization of the “international action” produced by the EU independent from or along with the individual foreign policies of its constituents.

The starting point of this paper is a widely used rhetoric. This rhetoric or reality is that the EU is a global actor. It is argued that “Europe must concentrate on global issues because some of the risks it faces, such as terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction originate in extra-European regions and therefore require a power projection capability” (Piening, 1997; quoted in Andreatta, 2005 p. 36). The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) (European Council, 2003) states that “As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product, and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player.” What does being a “global actor/player” mean? The *sui generis* character of the EU makes this question even more interesting as it implies a role which has been traditionally reserved to sovereign states.

Although the main International Relations (IR) theories explain the international system with a state-centric approach, especially since 1970s, it has been widely accepted that international organizations, non-state actors, transnational corporations, civil-society and even individuals are also relevant actors of international system. However, neither the state-centric assumptions of realism, nor the more flexible liberal approaches could suitably and accurately situate the EU within the international system. This deficiency has led Europeanist scholars to try to better explicate the EU’s role and status within the global politics. Bretherton and Vogler’s (2006) attempt to locate and conceptualise the EU as a *sui generis* global actor in construction or the comprehensive study of Hill and Smith (2005), which aims at bringing the studies on European foreign policy *in conversation* with main IR debates have been some of the comprehensive analyses which aimed at making up this deficiency.

Within the academia, there is more divergence than convergence with regard to the external status and role of this *sui generis* entity, especially when it comes to the foreign policy matters. Most of the literature on the EU foreign policy tries to explain “how does and how should the EU do what it does at international/global level?” Here comes the debate on the roles and status of the EU. Even though this paper does not aim at defining or redefining what sort of a *power* the EU is, or what it does cumulatively at international level, these discussions are helpful in understanding EU “actorness”^[2], in the sense that they help see what the distinguishing characteristics of the EU foreign policy are.

The main objective of this paper is to examine the “actorness” of the EU in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The ESS defines proliferation of weapons of mass

* The views and opinions expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or bind it in any way.

destruction (WMD) as “potentially the greatest threat to the European security”. Since EU has particular interest in the Mediterranean region and proliferation of WMD in the Mediterranean threatens regional, European and global security, the case on which this research will be developed is the southern shore of the Mediterranean region^[3]. Built on the threat assessment defined within the ESS, EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD (EU WMD Strategy) (Council of the EU, 2003f) indicates that “as security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean, a particular attention should be paid to the issue of proliferation in the Mediterranean area.” In this vein, the question that this paper aims to respond is the following: “To what extent the EU is/has been an actor in the field of non-proliferation of WMD in the Mediterranean?”

Time frame of this research, particularly with regard to the instruments and concrete actions of the EU, will be basically from 2003 (the year when the EU has taken strategic steps towards a common non-proliferation policy) until the end of 2010. Nevertheless, when necessary, the research will go beyond this time frame with a view to providing a more accurate and comprehensive picture.

This paper argues that due to a variety of reasons EU “actorness” in the field of non-proliferation of WMD in the Mediterranean has remained limited. However, it is not the aim of this paper to draw a general conclusion such as “if the EU is a weak actor on a critical security matter in its own neighbourhood, so it is obviously not a global high-politics actor”. The focus on the other hand is put on a specific issue area and case where the EU has interests and good reasons to act, without necessarily aiming at reaching general rules on EU “actorness” on so-called high-politics issues.

Actors in international relations and conceptualization of EU “actorness”

Actors in International Relations

Discussions on “actor” could be found in three different realms of IR. Firstly, the general IR paradigms are interested in the units of international system whose action matter. Second, actors are the main concerns of the studies on the foreign policy analysis (FPA) which is a sub-study of IR. Third, international law is also concerned with the subjects of international relations who have the legal capacity to act.

Within the study of FPA, actor refers to those units who are relevant to, or who may determine or influence the foreign policy making of states or other units who have the capacity to develop a foreign policy. One of the main concerns of the foreign policy analysts is, therefore, to define which actors should be taken into account for understanding the making of foreign policy. There are different approaches, such as the FPA based on a “structural perspective” (realism, neoliberal institutionalism, organizational behavioural approaches, social constructivism) and those which analyze it in terms of an “actor-based perspective” (cognitive and psychological approaches, bureaucratic politics model, liberal or societal actor approach, interpretative actor model) (Carlsnaes, 2008).

International law, on the other hand, is concerned with the legal personalities. It organizes principally the status of the states and the relations among them (Pazarci, 2003). International

law accepts international organizations as subjects of international system as long as they possess legal personality. The “actorness” of the EU, therefore, has been problematic until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty which provided the long-awaited legal personality to the Union as a whole. On the other hand, the United Nations (UN) Charter stipulates that membership in the United Nations is open to states (Art. 4 of the Charter). From legal and political point of view, not being a member to the UN and to the UN Security Council (UNSC) is seen as a deficiency for EU “actorness” at international level.

The general IR debate on actors, however, provides the proper realm. IR debate on actors is to a large extent concerned with either limiting or extending the number of the units whose presence or action would matter in international system. Depending on different theories, perspectives significantly vary. Traditional schools of IR, particularly realism, with its purely state-centric approach, refer to the states as the main actors of international system. Other entities, such as international organizations and non-state actors are given secondary status compared to states. According to realists, states and especially powerful ones (or the most powerful ones, namely superpowers) are the only significant actors and all other actors are less important, and only sovereign states have capacity to develop a foreign policy (Baylis, Smith and Owens, 2010). Therefore, within the realist understanding of international relations, there is no room for EU “actorness”. Neorealism’s father Kenneth Waltz (2000) argues that Europe cannot become a great power unless if it becomes a state. While applauding the level of economic integration achieved by the EU as “an accomplishment without historical precedent”, he believes that depending on members’ consent on foreign and military policy make it impossible for the EU to take “bold or risky action”.

Liberals (pluralism, liberal institutionalism, neoliberalism etc.) on the other hand, include, among others, non-state and transnational actors, intergovernmental and civil-society organizations, interest groups and even individuals to their studies. The “complex interdependence” model developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye and Oran Young’s “mixed actor” model provide two of the main neo-liberal challenges to the realist assumption. Even though the liberal approaches extend the number of actors, they still do not resolve the problem of situating correctly the autonomous “actorness” of the EU within the international system. In general, liberals perceive the EU as an intergovernmental organization (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p.16).

Challenging the traditional and rationalist IR schools, the social constructivist interpretation of international relations is not about singling out or diversifying actors. Although state continues to be the reference point, the social constructivism basically argues that both the actors (agents) and the structure (namely the so-called anarchic character of international system) are in social interaction, thus they are constructed throughout social processes. Therefore, social constructivists focus on social interaction between the “agents and structure” and the ideational factors and processes through which the actors or the system is constructed. They try to understand “how agents produce structures and how structures produce agents” (Baylis, Smith and Owens, 2010). Therefore their understanding of actor is not limited in number or character. New actors and new systems can be socially constructed. Alexander Wendt’s well-known “The Anarchy is what states make of it” is a pure challenge in this sense to the mainstream IR schools. From this point of view, the sole existence of the EU would demonstrate that agents could interpret and construct a new social reality based on ideational factors, such as shared values and norms.

EU "Actorness" in International Relations

Defining EU's Roles and Status within the Global Politics

Studies on the external impact of the EU try in general to answer "how does and how should the EU do what it does at international level?" In this vein, the debates on "the capability-expectations gap", the coherence-consistency issues, whether "the EU is an economic giant but a political dwarf", or whether the EU's international action reflects the "lowest common denominator" or the "sum of what the EU and its member states do" provide food for endless discussions. Whether the EU is or ought to be a "civilian", "normative" or "military" is one of the main debates about EU's external roles and status. The attempt to create distinctive terminologies to explain what sort of power the EU is regarded by some as a pretext to cover-up Europe's military weakness (Kagan, 2002). Yet these debates still provide a good start for understanding EU's international "actorness", since they help see what the foreign policy characteristics, capabilities and incapacities of the EU would be.

A number of scholars define EU as a civilian or soft-power and argue that EU inherently should focus on its civilian role, since the project of European integration itself is a civilian and civilising one. This group is convinced that militarizing EU's goals and policies would damage the external image and the global impact of the Union. The basis of the "civilian power Europe" was formulated by François Duchene (Duchene, 1972). "Civilian power" notion, based on economic aspects of power, highlights the weight of the EU within the global production and trade, and implies that the "actorness" of the EU depends on economic and civilian (including diplomacy) dimension. This concept suggests that the EU, without resorting to military means, defends liberal trade, democracy and human rights (Hill and Smith, 2005).

"Normative power Europe" is also a popular notion that denies the centrality of the state within the international system. This critical view, based on social constructivist approach, puts an emphasis on ideational, cognitive and ideological factors, rather than material ones. The focus is on external projection of EU's identity, values and norms. "Normative power" claims "an international role for the EU as a promoter of norms" (Manners, 2002). Related with "normative power" notion, some scholars see enlargement as the most powerful instrument of the EU, which provides a capacity to politically and economically transform other countries, in line with EU's values, norms and rules (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Andreatta, 2005).

Another group of scholars believes that the civilian power is insufficient and the EU has to become a military power. Hedley Bull (1982), in his well known critique, argues that "civilian power" was a "contradiction in terms". Pijpers (1998) argues that the EU, while trying to influence the outside world and making strong declarations on its identity, cannot isolate itself from conflicting demands of other actors. A group of proponents of the "military power Europe" aspire a deeper integration and institutionalization on defence and security matters. They emphasize the need of a European "security/strategic/military culture"/"grand strategy", namely a true integration in the field of foreign policy, security and defence (Cornish and Edwards, 2001 and 2005; Meyer, 2004; Howorth, 2010; Biscop, Howorth and Giegerich, 2009). Critics of military power Europe, on the other hand, like Karen E. Smith (2000), have argued that despite its weakness the development of the defence dimension for the European integration and the prospective incorporation of the Western European Union into the EU represents an image

change for the EU (abandoning of civilian power image, the key values on which the EU as built).

Furthermore, there are a number of comprehensive studies in the literature (Hill and Smith, 2005; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008; Smith, K.E., 2008; Smith, H., 2002) that focus on the overall impact of EU's foreign policy. Some of these suggest rather a mixed model of roles for the EU. Bretherton and Vogler (2006) argue that EU is a global actor in construction with policies covering almost all the significant issue areas of global politics, including the military dimension of crisis management. According to Hill and Smith (2005, pp. 4-5) "EU can be seen as a power, a centre of gravity, a model, a magnet, a regime, and a mere arena, or various combinations of these".

Cremona (2004) contends that, EU, "as an organization of attributed competences", acts most of the time and inevitably alongside with the Member States, hence, this complexity limits the integrated "actorness" of the EU. This can be interpreted as EU's political "actorness" at global scale should be analyzed case-by-case, instead of reaching overall conclusions. For this, a conceptualization and some criteria are needed on which EU "actorness" can be tested.

EU "actorness" conceptualized

Keeping in mind that each role assumed by or attributed to the EU "is a result of balance or tension between different interests and players within the Union polity (Member States, EU institutions and non-state actors" (Cremona, 2004), it could also be argued that "actorness" in each specific international issue is also a result of these balances and tensions.

Bretherton and Vogler (2006) offer a useful conceptualization for the "actorness" of the EU. They deny comparing the EU with states and develop a theory specific to the Union, which they define as a *sui generis* entity under construction. They explain EU "actorness" based on the notions of "presence, opportunity and capability" (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 24).

Dryburgh (2008) argues that Bretherton and Vogler's criteria present problems in analysing individual policy areas. She, thus, reformulates them in line with Larsen's (2005) suggestions and assesses EU "actorness" based on the following criteria: "a) articulations of actorness, b) consistent and concrete policies, c) a diplomatic/administrative apparatus, d) resources and policy instruments, and e) third party perceptions of EU actorness (Dryburgh, 2008, p. 257)"

Both Bretherton and Vogler and Dryburgh prioritize ideational factors even though they include concrete policies and policy instrument into their criteria. However, the material factors should be better accommodated, since "actorness" is about acting, but not only about sharing values, creating expectations or perceiving and giving meaning to external and internal environment. Smith (2004, p.110) explains that CFSP performance record can be measured, among others, by analysing "actions (an increase in the overall number of CFSP actions taken each year) and instruments (an expansion of the policy tools used to meet the goals of CFSP)".

Against this background, in the following chapter EU "actorness" in the field of non-proliferation of WMD in the southern Mediterranean will be analysed in line with a mixed approach under the following titles/criteria:

- a. External context: The main focus will be on events which enable or constrain the EU “actorness”.
- b. EU’s self-presentation and third party perceptions: The self-presentation of the EU will demonstrate how the EU has interpreted and accorded meanings to the events. The third party perceptions will be analyzed by looking at the available joint bilateral documents which would illustrate the acceptance by the third party to enter into a dialogue or cooperation with the EU in this particular field.
- c. Developments in the EU foreign policy apparatus: This is about looking at the changes at institutional character of the EU which may have impact on EU “actorness” on the CFSP in general and this specific case in particular.
- d. Consistency: The main aim will be to understand whether there is an overall consistency among the member states with a view to achieving a common non-proliferation policy in the Mediterranean.
- e. Availability of policy instruments and concrete actions: The available instruments for the EU on this case and concrete actions taken by the EU will be assessed.

Findings under each criterion will help draw conclusions on the non-proliferation “actorness” of the EU in the southern Mediterranean.

EU in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean

RAND’s 1996 Report “Strategic Exposure – Proliferation Around the Mediterranean” (Lesser and Tellis, 1996) states in its preface that, “Nowhere are the effects of proliferation trends felt more keenly than around the Mediterranean, where the European and Middle Eastern Security environments meet, and where NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies are increasingly exposed to the spillover effects of instability to the south”. EU WMD Strategy stresses that “Proliferation of WMD is a global threat, which requires a global approach. However, as security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean, we should pay particular attention to the issue of proliferation in the Mediterranean area”. What are the threats posed by the proliferation of WMD in the Mediterranean region? So far, there has been no threat assessment made public by the EU on proliferation issues in the Mediterranean that can be used as a reference guide.

Fitzpatrick (2011), in his recent study on the nuclear capabilities in the Middle East offers a categorization, where he divides the states of the region into four groups: i) nuclear-armed state, ii) states that have posed proliferation concerns, iii) states with significant civilian nuclear infrastructure, iv) states with little or no nuclear infrastructure. While Israel falls into the first group, Libya and Syria fall to the second, Algeria and Egypt to the third, and finally, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon and Tunisia to the last group. Cordesman (2004), in his 2004 report, comprehensively elaborates the WMD capabilities in the Middle East and North Africa. The table below (Table 1) provides an updated and overall picture on the WMD capabilities in the Mediterranean^[4]. If one reads this table independent from perceptions towards and the political systems of the countries to which these data belong, it is obvious that the biggest problem is the

state that possesses the nuclear weapons. However, it is generally believed (particularly in the West), that Israel's policy of "nuclear ambiguity" and its possession of nuclear weapons are to a certain extent justifiable^[5]. Nevertheless, although Israel enjoys monopoly over nuclear weapons, some other actors of the region also possess WMD and a lot of development and research activities are taking place. While Syria and Egypt are known to have deployed/stockpiled chemical weapons, Libya of Gaddafi ("once a pariah, then ally in the fight against terror"^[6], and a pariah again in 2011^[7]), has made good progress in dismantling its WMD program^[8].

Besides the WMD capabilities, one of the main indicators of the problem of proliferation of WMD in the Mediterranean is the status of signature and ratification of and compliance with the treaties establishing the norms, rules, regimes and organizations of non-proliferation^[9]. In fact, the codification and treaty-based international *acquis* have reached a quite satisfactory level. However, there is still a long way to go for further universalization of international treaties on non-proliferation. Not surprisingly, most of the deficiencies and noncompliance have so far stemmed from the Middle East and Mediterranean region. The following table (Table 2) illustrates the status in the Mediterranean of the principal international non-proliferation instruments, namely the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC). Also with regard to the more recent concept of "terrorism-WMD proliferation nexus", important normative steps have so far been taken to establish and strengthen the treaty based structure and political cooperation and initiatives against this threat. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the UNSC Resolution 1540 are the main international documents as regards proliferation-terrorism nexus. Table 2 illustrates that, in terms of the status of the treaties and relevant international documents, most problematic actors of the region are Israel, Syria and Egypt while Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Tunisia, Libya and Algeria (though the latter two, and particularly Libya, had raised concerns of non-compliance in the past) are the "well-behaved" ones. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation, Israel is the only country which is not yet party to the NPT. As regards CTBT, Israel and Egypt, both of which signed the treaty in 1996, have yet to ratify it in order that the treaty enters into force. As to the BWC and CWC, neither Israel (signed CWC in 1996), nor Syria (signed BWC in 1972), nor Egypt (signed BWC in 1972) has yet ratified these. The newly emerged agreements and initiatives against non-state actors also lack participation of key actors in the region.

In short, together with WMD capabilities and WMD-terrorism nexus, adherence to the treaties and other relevant documents are important issues in the Mediterranean and it would be normal to expect from the EU to put a special emphasis on these matters.

Table 1. Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities in the southern Mediterranean

| Country | Nuclear | | Chemical | Biological |
|----------------|----------|---|---|---|
| | WMD | Civilian | | |
| Algeria | Research | 2 Research reactors operational | Development? | Research |
| Egypt | Research | 2 Research reactors operational | Stockpiled (used in 1963-67) | Development? |
| Israel | Deployed | 1 Research reactor operational | Production capability | Production capability |
| Jordan | | 1 Research reactor planned | | |
| Lebanon | | | | |
| Libya | | 1 Research reactor operational ^(a) | Dismantling (Before: deployed; used in 1987) ^(b) | Dismantling (Before: development?) ^(c) |
| Morocco | | 2 Research reactor under construction | | |
| Syria | Research | 1 Research reactor operational | Deployed | Development? |
| Tunisia | | 1 Research reactor planned | | Research reactor planned |

Source: Kienzle (2008) - Original table updated for Libya based on information available in US State Department's 2010 Compliance report (Department of State of the USA, 2010) Original Sources: Cordesman, 2005; James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies; and Nuclear Threat Initiative.

“Deployed” = Nuclear, chemical or biological weapons integrated in military forces and ready for use in the event of conflict.

Stockpiled = Produced significant quantity of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, but these are not stored in close proximity to military units that would employ them.

Production capability = Able to produce significant quantity of fissile nuclear material or chemical or biological agents, but not known to have done so.

Development = Engaged in laboratory- or pilot-scale activities to develop production capability for fissile material or chemical or biological agents.

Research = Engaged in dual-use research with peaceful civilian applications, but that can also be used to build technical capacity and/or infrastructure for nuclear, chemical or biological weapons development and production.

Dismantling = Removing nuclear facilities connected to weapons programme or chemical or biological weapons from deployment to storage areas and destroying agents and munitions.

? = Published assessments are uncertain or conflicting reports raise questions about a state's capabilities.”

(a) The finding of the US State Department's 2010 Compliance report reads as follows: “Compliance issues arising from Libya's past noncompliance with its NPT and IAEA obligations have been resolved. Libyan nuclear activities during the 2004-2008 period of this Report were consistent with these obligations.”

(b) The finding of the US State Department's 2010 Compliance report reads as follows: “Libya's disclosure regarding its chemical weapons program, its accession to the CWC, and the destruction of its unfilled CW munitions, solid precursor chemicals, and specialized CW production equipment are significant steps toward Libya coming into full compliance with its CWC obligations, and serve as a model for those countries that have not yet ratified the CWC. Libya has destroyed all of its Category 3 munitions and some of its Category 2 precursors in accordance with Article IV, and Part IV(A) of the CWC's Verification Annex. It has presented plans to the OPCW for destruction of its Category 1 CW and conversion of its CW production facilities. Libya has not yet met its obligations under Article VII.”

(c) The finding of the US State Department's 2010 Compliance report reads as follows: “The United States notes that Libya is complying with its obligations under the BWC and is fulfilling the biological weapons-related commitments it made in December 2003 when it committed to rid itself of internationally proscribed weapons.”

Table 2. Status of International Non-Proliferation Instruments in the southern Mediterranean

| Country | Nuclear | | | | Chemical and Biological, Delivery Means, and Terrorism etc. | | | | | |
|----------------|-------------|---------------------|----------------|----------------|---|-------------|-------------|------------|--------------|---------------|
| | <i>NPT</i> | <i>CTBT</i> | <i>CSA</i> | <i>AP</i> | <i>CWC</i> | <i>BWC</i> | <i>HCoC</i> | <i>PSI</i> | <i>GICNT</i> | <i>ICSANT</i> |
| Algeria | R (1995) | R (2003) | I.F. (1997) | App. (2004) | R (1995) | R (2001) | X | X | X | R (2011) |
| Egypt | R (1981) | S (1996) (rr) | I.F. (1982) | X | X | S (1972) | X | X | X | S (2005) |
| Israel | X | S (1996) (rr) | I.F. (1975) | X | S (1996) | X | X | Prtcp. | PN | S (2006) |
| Jordan | R (1970) | R (1998) | I.F. (1978) | I.F. (1998) | R (1997) | R (1975) | SS | Prtcp. | PN | S (2005) |
| Lebanon | R (1970) | R (2008) | I.F. (1973) | X | R (2008) | R (1975) | X | X | X | S (2005) |
| Libya | R (1975) | R (2004) | I.F. (1980) | I.F. (2006) | R (2004) | R (1982) | SS | Prtcp. | PN | R (2008) |
| Morocco | R (1970) | R (2000) | I.F. (1975) | S (2004) | R (1995) | R (2004) | SS | Prtcp. | PN | R (2010) |
| Syria | R (1968) | X | I.F. (1992) | X | X | S (1972) | X | X | X | S (2005) |
| Tunisia | R (1970) | R (2004) | I.F. (1990) | S (2005) | R (1997) | R (1973) | SS | Prtcp. | X | R (2010) |

Source: Own illustration built on tables produced by Santoro, D. (2011) and based on data/information from IAEA (2010); HCoC Web Site: <http://www.hcoc.at/subscribe.php> (accessed on 7 August 2011); PSI Web Site: <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm> (accessed on 7 August 2011)

R (Ratified); S (Signed); I.F. (In Force); App. (Approved); SS (Suscribing State); **Prtcp.** (Participant); **PN** (Partner Nation); X (non-party/not signed/not subscribed to/do not participate/is not partner); rr (ratification required for the treaty to enter into force).

NPT: Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

CTBT: The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

CSA: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

AP: Additional Protocol

CWC: The Chemical Weapons Convention

BWC: The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

HCoC: Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

PSI: The Proliferation Security Initiative

GICNT: The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

ICSANT: International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

EU's non-proliferation policy in the Mediterranean

The present section will focus in more depth on EU's non-proliferation "actorness" in the southern Mediterranean region. In accordance with the conceptual framework, the analysis will be conducted based on the assessment of the following criteria: "external context", "developments in the EU foreign policy apparatus", "EU's self-presentation and third party perceptions", "consistency" and "availability of policy instruments and concrete actions".

a) External context

EU's non-proliferation policy has emerged and developed in line with the opportunities provided by the external context. "Carter non-proliferation policy" and the adoption by several EC members of the so-called London directives were the two main external factors that led to the creation of the Working Group on non-proliferation under the EPC. The end of Cold War, the Gulf War (1990-1991), September 11 terror attacks and the war in Iraq (2003) all influenced the development of EU non-proliferation policy. Terrorist attacks perpetrated against the EU countries – 11 March 2004 Madrid and 7 July 2005 London bombings – revived the fear of terrorism-WMD nexus with its direct impact on the heart of European capitals. The Concept Paper adopted by the Council on 11-12 December 2006 states that these attacks "underscore the new challenges concerning non-state actors, the imperative to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD or related materials and therefore the critical importance to step up efforts to implement the EU WMD Strategy. The risk that this threat may well one day or another materialise in Europe or elsewhere is real and has to be taken into account by decision-makers in the EU" (Council of the EU, 2006c).

EU's Mediterranean policy and its non-proliferation dimension also developed in interaction with the external context. The EU was actively involved in the Middle East problem since the Venice Declaration of 13 June 1980 (European Union, 1980), which highlighted Palestinian people's right to self-determination and the necessity to associate Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) into the peace talks. Since then insecurity, instability and lack of peace became the centre of concern and strategic priority for the EU^[10]. Security issues and necessity for a regional political dialogue have become the key elements of EU's approach towards the Mediterranean region since the 1990s. Besides the Middle East (including issues involving Iraq, Syria and Lebanon), situation in Algeria in the early 1990s, the Libyan case from the 1980s and terrorism were posing significant regional and global security challenges, including its non-proliferation dimension. Internally, EU's consecutive enlargement processes were steering it to formulate and develop specific relationships with its neighbourhood.

In this frame, EU's Mediterranean policy started to take shape with a broader regional perspective since 1990s [the Conclusions of the European Councils in Lisbon (June 1992), at Corfu (June 1994), in Essen (December 2004) made special references to relations with the Mediterranean region with a perspective of transforming the region "into a zone of peace, stability, prosperity and cooperation"; and the Essen Council introduced the concept of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) to the external agenda of the EU^[11]]. Against this background, Barcelona Conference was convened on 27-28 November 1995, which ended with the adoption of the Barcelona Declaration establishing the framework of the EMP (mostly referred to as "the Barcelona Process"^[12]). "Political and security partnership with a view to establishing a common area of peace and stability" was one of the three main pillars of the EMP. 1995 Barcelona Declaration already stated the following "The participants... undertake... to promote regional security by acting, inter alia, in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes, and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT and/or regional arrangements such as weapons free zones including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions. The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical

and biological, and their delivery systems. Furthermore the parties will consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms.” 2000 EU Common Strategy for the Mediterranean (European Council, 2000) reaffirmed the non-proliferation dimension of EU's Mediterranean policy, with a particular emphasis on the promotion of the signature and ratification of all non-proliferation instruments (NPT, CWC, BWC and CTBT) and on the objective of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

However, while it was the external context of the Middle East peace talks of 1990s and Gulf War (1990-1991) that paved the way for an institutional cooperation framework in the Mediterranean (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005), the same conflict paralyzed the EMP, thus non-proliferation objectives in a such complex multilateral framework remained mostly at rhetoric. The only “de facto” nuclear weapon state of the region, namely Israel, prefers a WMD-free zone^[13] only after a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, its counterparts, primarily Egypt and Syria, puts forward such a zone as a precondition for any comprehensive peace agreement (Kienzle, 2008). Not surprisingly, in such an environment, EU's “actorness” on non-proliferation in the Mediterranean has remained limited.

In the context of the stalemate in the EMP process and the 2004 enlargement, the EU added a new bilateral dimension to its Mediterranean policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). However the key documents and the country specific documents of the ENP barely touched upon the non-proliferation issues. The only visible exception was about ENP Action Plans that included the EU standard clause on non-proliferation of WMD.

Since the adoption of the EU WMD Strategy, the external context, and particularly the situation in the Middle East has not changed in favour of EU's non-proliferation policy in the region. On positive side, one of the most unexpected developments in the region was Libya's (the only country in the region that participated neither in Barcelona Process, nor in the new Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) initiative, nor in the ENP) radical shift of policy which was achieved through long secret talks and initiatives carried out by the governments of the US and the UK^[14]. Apart from this isolated non-proliferation success (in which EU's role was marginal, if there was any), the decade of 2000-2010 did not help the EU effectively pursue its objectives in the Mediterranean, inter alia, on non-proliferation. The Middle East, following the deadlock in the peace talks since 1996, and starting from early 2000s, has been going through a cycle of continuing conflicts, wars, bloodshed, occupation, crises and marginalization (at both sides). The so-called Road Map for peace drawn by the “Quartet” or the so-called “Arab Peace Initiative” so far has not changed the picture. The same decade also witnessed proliferation related allegations against Syria. Israel even bombed on 6 September 2007 a facility near the town of al-Kibar on (north-eastern Syria) claiming that this was a nuclear facility with military purposes (Fitzpatrick, 2011). Report by the IAEA Director General released on 24 May 2011 concluded that “the destroyed building was very likely a nuclear reactor” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011a). Syria, on the other hand, was denying since May 2008 “that the destroyed building was a non-nuclear military installation”. The Board of Governors on 9 June 2011 regarded this as a non-compliance with Syria's Safeguards Agreement and decided to report the matter to the UNSC and UNGA (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011b). This development, from the attack in 2007 until the report of the IAEA, is one of the most serious non-compliance cases in the Mediterranean faced during the last decade, along with the

already “resolved” cases of Iraq and Libya. So far the EU has remained very silent on Syrian case of alleged non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreements.

In short, the deep-rooted and complex problems and frequent crises in the Middle East served as the main and constant constraint that limited EU “actorness” in the field of non-proliferation in the southern Mediterranean. Nevertheless, as will be further discussed in the coming sections, the EU, through several instruments, tried to be active on non-proliferation issues in the region.

b) Developments in the EU foreign policy apparatus

The developments with regard to the institutionalization of the EU foreign policy apparatus with a particular emphasis on the non-proliferation issues have already been elaborated (See: Chapter 2.1.). The table (Table 3) of chronology below sums up what was already mentioned before.

At bureaucratic/diplomatic level, the Council Secretariat is the main EU body on issues falling under the realm of CFSP. Besides, the PSC, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), Council Working Groups, the Directorate-General External Relations of the Council General Secretariat, and DG External Relations of the Commission have been the main institutional bodies. With the creation of the EEAS^[15] all the administrative entities in the field of external action are transferred to the EEAS. These include CSDP and crisis management structures such as the EU Situation Centre (SITCEN)^[16], Directorate-General External Relations of the Council Secretariat (including the Directorate for Non-Proliferation of WMD) and Directorate-General for External Relations of the Commission (Council of the EU, 2010b).

So far, the creation of the EEAS has been one of the most astonishing developments for the EU foreign policy apparatus with a view to ensuring better coordination, coherence and effectiveness. The press statement^[17] on the occasion of the establishment of the EEAS states that “Creation of the EEAS is one of the most significant changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon... It is aimed at making the EU's external action more coherent and efficient, thereby increasing the EU's influence in the world.” Within the newly developing EEAS structure - which is divided in administrative, geographical and thematic departments - the Office of the Personal Representative, thus the non-proliferation of WMD matters, falls under the “Managing Director for Global and Multilateral Issues”. Annalisa Giannella, the former Personal Representative of the High Representative for non-proliferation, became at the beginning the new head of the Office of the EU Representative for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Issues, which functions as a Directorate under the “Managing Director Global and Multilateral Issues”

Besides EU's interior institutional structure, the multilateral and bilateral institutional bodies existing in the Mediterranean context can also be added to non-proliferation policy apparatus of the EU. As was explained previously, at multilateral level, since 1995 the EU has engaged with the region through the Barcelona Process, the EMP. The 1995 Barcelona Declaration envisages that “The Ministers for Foreign Affairs will meet periodically in order to monitor the application of this Declaration and define actions enabling the objectives of the partnership to be achieved. The various activities will be followed by ad hoc thematic meetings of ministers, senior officials and experts...” From 1995 to 2008, the year when the process has converted into the Union for the Mediterranean, Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU and Mediterranean partner countries met eight times. Issues pertinent to political and security field have been taken

up at these ministerial meetings, as well as meetings of the Senior Officials under the political dialogue section. Thus, non-proliferation issues were also touched upon, however in a general and rather weak manner. For instance, the Conclusions of the 8th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which took place on 27-28 November 2006 in Tampere (Finland), stated that “Ministers reiterate their will to continue promoting dialogue and co-operation on political and security issues..., ... as well as implementation of and compliance with the relevant existing international obligations under multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation agreements to which Euromed Partners are party” (Council of the EU, 2006b). This can be interpreted in a way that participants do not agree on promoting dialogue and cooperation on implementation of and compliance with non-proliferation agreements to which the Euromed Partners are not party. Taking into account the status of the international instruments (See: Chapter 3.2.), the participants in fact enter into a very little, if any, political commitment. The newly established UfM process did not introduce any new institutional set-up for political and security matters^[18]. The UfM introduces the bi-annual Summit meetings, in addition to the Ministerial meetings and Senior Official Meetings (SOM), where political dialogue is inherently part of the agenda. Nevertheless, since the Paris Summit of 13 July 2008 (which established the UfM) and the Marseille Foreign Ministers Meeting of 3-4 November 2008, neither a Summit nor a Foreign Ministers meeting could have so far taken place due to the political impasse in the Middle East^[19]. Within this context, even though both Paris Summit Declaration and Marseille Final Statement have made quite strong references to non-proliferation issues, so far the UfM has not provided an institutional added value for EU's non-proliferation policy in the southern Mediterranean.

At bilateral level, the joint bodies (such as the Association Councils, senior official meetings etc.) established by the Association Agreements provide an institutional framework where the EU and the third countries of the region, under the agenda of political dialogue, can talk about foreign policy and security issues, including non-proliferation of WMD. The bilateral framework in EU's relations with the southern Mediterranean countries has so far been provided the most effective instruments for EU's non-proliferation “actorness” in the region, particularly through the insertion of non-proliferation clauses to relevant documents (such as the Association Agreements and the Action Plans) (This will be further elaborated in the following sections).

In short, despite its deficiencies, the institutional set-up in EU's foreign policy apparatus has reached a quite sophisticated level. However, in terms of foreign and security policy issues, national governments keep playing the central role. Kienzle (2008; p. 138) explains that “to a large extent, the EU non-proliferation policy is still capital based, i.e. national experts and representatives from the Member State capitals play a pivotal role.” In relation to this, Dryburgh (2008) argues that even the administrative/diplomatic apparatus of the Member States play an important role “the fact that these are available to and often coordinated at the EU level makes them part of the Union's apparatus, albeit at the discretion of the Member States.” From this point of view, national foreign policy structures can be perceived as complementary elements of the EU foreign policy. This prediction has naturally its limits, since it is directly linked to the level of consistency between common and national policies. However, the progress in the institutionalization of the EU foreign policy system, since its inception, illustrates that member states may agree on further improvements on institutional set-up and decision making processes. The reforms (last of which were introduced by the Lisbon Treaty^[20]) on voting systems and on other decision making rules, such as the principle of constructive abstention and the possibilities for enhanced cooperation, are some examples how member states may

find practical answers to institutional deficiencies. Furthermore, the EU has resorted to multilateral and bilateral institutional structures to pursue its non-proliferation objectives in the Mediterranean. Even though the multilateral framework has been taken hostage by the political stalemate in the Middle East, the bilateral context helped provide visibility to EU's non-proliferation "actorness" in the region.

Table 3. Chronology Table on Developments with Institutional Impact on EU Foreign Policy Apparatus with a particular emphasis on EU WMD non-proliferation policy

| Date | Development |
|---------------------------|---|
| 1 January 1958 | The Euratom Treaty enters into force. Includes internal non-proliferation and safeguards measures. |
| 27 October 1970 | Davignon Report is adopted. Establishes the intergovernmental cooperation mechanism outside of the community structure, namely the European Political Cooperation (EPC). |
| 1981 | A Working Party on non-proliferation inside the framework of the EPC is established. Represents the start of the EU non-proliferation policy. |
| 1 July 1987 | The Single European Act (SEA) is adopted. The EPC and the working group system are formalized. Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons is established subsequently. |
| 1 November 1993 | The Treaty of Maastricht enters into force. Establishes the three-pillar-system. The CFSP is one of the three pillars. New foreign policy instruments (common positions, joint actions etc.) are introduced. EU foreign policy actions increased accordingly in the field of WMD proliferation. |
| 1995 | Working Groups on Nuclear Non-Proliferation (CONUC) and Non-Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CONOC) are combined into one Working Group called the Non-Proliferation Working Group (CONOP). Provides for deeper institutionalization and formalization as to EU WMD non-proliferation policy. |
| 1 May 1999 | The Treaty of Amsterdam enters into force. The position of the High Representative for the CFSP is created. The CFSP instruments (principles and general guidelines, common strategies, common positions, joint actions etc.) are systematized. Political and Security Committee is established. Leads to closer institutional framework for foreign policy cooperation. |
| June-December 2003 | Strategic documents (Basic Principles, Action Plan etc.) on EU WMD non-proliferation policy are adopted paving way eventually to the adoption of the EU WMD Strategy. |
| 1 December 2009 | Lisbon Treaty enters into force. Post of the President of the European Council and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Vice-President of the European Commission) (HRVP) are created. The European External Action Service (EEAS) is established. Single legal personality provided to the EU. The "Solidarity Clause" is introduced for cases including terrorist attacks. Within the developing EEAS structure, Directorate for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament is established. |

Sources: Own Illustration on the basis of Sauer, T. (2003); Kienzle, B. (2008); Ahlström, C. (2005); Müller, H. (2007)

c) EU's self-presentation and third party perceptions

This section is intended for addressing two basic questions: 1) How does the EU present itself in the field of non-proliferation with a particular emphasis on the Mediterranean region? 2) How do the concerned actors of the region perceive the EU and what kind of expectations they may have?

For the first question, it is necessary to look at some of the strategic documents produced within the EU, such as (in chronological order) the Common Strategy of the European Council on the Mediterranean region (European Council, 2000), the EU WMD Strategy (Council of the EU, 2003f), the ESS (and the Report on the Implementation of the ESS) (European Council, 2003 and 2008), ENP Strategy Paper (European Commission, 2004), Final Report on EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East (European Council, 2004) and the new lines for action by the EU in combating the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems (Council of the EU, 2008).

From these strategic documents, it is understood that the EU sees proliferation of WMD as potentially the greatest threat to the security of Europe. The ESS stresses that "security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean", thus "EU should pay particular attention to the issue of proliferation in the Mediterranean area". The EU is highly concerned of the possibility of a WMD arms race in the region, particularly in the Middle East. This concern is not only stemming from states, but also non-state actors. The EU shows interest in engaging with the region through security cooperation, among others, in the framework of multilateral (Barcelona Process – UfM) and bilateral (the ENP) instruments. The EU presents itself as an active actor in the field of non-proliferation in possession of a variety of instruments. One of the main characteristics of EU's self-presentation in the field of non-proliferation is that it privileges effective multilateralism and the universalization of multilateral agreements. The EU WMD Strategy states that "Effective multilateralism is the cornerstone of the European strategy for combating proliferation of WMD". The EU indicates in all relevant documents that it is interested mainly in two aspects of the non-proliferation problem in the Mediterranean region. First, the EU seeks wider adherence to, in other words universalization of, main non-proliferation treaties and full compliance with these. The main repercussion of this approach is the objective of introducing non-proliferation conditionality to relations with third countries. The ENP Strategy Paper states that "The privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual commitment to common values... Commitments will also be sought to certain essential aspects of the EU's external action, including, in particular, the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as abidance by international law..." The text adopted by the Council on 17 November 2003 determines the modalities of the inclusion of a "non-proliferation clause" in the joint agreed documents with third countries. In line with this, the second aspect of EU's regional approach is its support for the proposal for a WMD free zone in the region, particularly in the Middle East. However, although these strategic documents prioritize EU's neighbourhood and proliferation concerns, they do not make direct references to tough cases/countries of the region. Furthermore, particularly as regards the most problematic three countries of the region in terms of non-proliferation (Israel, Egypt and Syria), country specific ENP documents (such as the Country Strategy Papers or National Indicative Programmes) do not touch upon non-proliferation issues at all^[21]. In this context, EU's self-presentation on non-proliferation issues in the southern Mediterranean remains rather weak and reluctant. The EU seems to be more interested in creation of an ideal atmosphere in the region

where all actors become party and abide by all relevant international non-proliferation documents, which would lead to a WMD free zone (first in the Middle East and beyond that in the Mediterranean), rather than focusing on specific and conflicting issues.

While the EU is presenting itself as an active non-proliferation actor that privileges effective multilateralism and universalization of international documents in the region without singling out certain problematic countries, how do the concerned actors perceive the EU? In responding this question, this paper looked at bilateral documents which are agreed upon particularly subsequent to EU's decision to include non-proliferation clause to agreements with third countries (including ENP Action Plans). Since the non-proliferation clause decision of the EU, only an Association Agreement^[22] with Syria has been negotiated with success (still pending signature and entry into force), which surprisingly includes a real non-proliferation clause. In other cases, the EU and the third countries agreed on ENP Action Plans which include provisions on non-proliferation. Only in cases of Algeria and Libya (the latter has participated neither in the EMP, nor the UfM, nor the ENP) there has been no bilaterally agreed document which may include a non-proliferation provision (The inclusion of non-proliferation clause will be further elaborated in the section dedicated to EU actions and). Despite the incomplete and vague commitments by the regional actors achieved through the insertion of non-proliferation clauses/chapters into the bilateral documents, the concerned actors of the region at least accept to enter into a non-proliferation dialogue with the EU, therefore perceive the EU in a way or another as an actor in the field. Nevertheless, this would not mean that, for instance, Israel would accept to end its nuclear ambiguity policy with a view to obtaining a deeper cooperation with the EU, or Egypt and Syria would accede to the relevant non-proliferation instruments just for becoming a privileged partner of the EU. The situation in the region is so complex that, neither the EU is in a position to present itself as a trend-changer or rule-setter in the field of non-proliferation in the region, nor the concerned actors would have such an expectation from the EU.

d) Consistency

"Consistence" or "coherence"^[23], in the context of EU foreign policy making, is one of the most resorted concepts through which the international "actorness" of the EU is easily undermined. One main assumption is that the EU cannot be an effective actor until it is unified, since achieving common policies and decisions depend on compromise among 27 distinct national foreign policies. However, the EU has so far proven to be successful in many cases and fields in achieving this compromise. Moreover, in reality, not only the EU, but also national foreign policy systems are not always consistent. Thus, the issue of "consistence" in the EU context is exaggerated to a certain extent. Nuttal (2005) explains this by a basic difference between the EU and the conventional state; that is, inconsistency in state's foreign policies is an internal process hidden from the public eye, whereas inconsistency within the EU is an external process exposed to full public view. Nuttal differentiates between three types of consistency: horizontal (between different EU policies) institutional (between pillars/different institutions) and vertical (between EU and national policies). Within this categorization, the present section of this research is interested more with vertical consistency.

The minimum prerequisite of consistency among the EU members with regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, potentially the most dangerous WMD, was achieved in 1992 when France ratified the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear. However, Ahlström (2005),

points out that “prior to 2003 [i.e. before the adoption of strategic documents on EU WMD policy] it was not possible to speak of a coherent EU policy on non-proliferation matters”. As was discussed earlier, the institutional development within the EU towards achieving a Union level non-proliferation policy has reached quite a satisfactory level. Especially, since the September 11 terror attacks and the Iraq War (2003), the EU has achieved good progress in the field. However, there remain some fundamental issues related to consistency limiting EU’s overall “actorness” in the field of non-proliferation. These are mainly due to the natural divisions within the EU: “NATO member vs. non-NATO member”, “nuclear weapon states (NWS) vs. non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS)” and finally “member States with civilian nuclear capacity/industry vs. those who do not have civilian nuclear energy industries” (Sauer, 2003). While 21 member states that are at the same time NATO-member enjoy the nuclear deterrence and collective defence system of the alliance, others remain outside of the NATO nuclear umbrella. Secondly, only two (France and the UK) of the EU members are NWS (both recognized as NWS by the NPT), while other two members (Sweden and Ireland) participate in the New Agenda Coalition (NAC)^[24] which follows a nuclear disarmament agenda. In fact, the existence of NWS, particularly the nuclear arsenal of France, can be interpreted as an inconsistency in the Mediterranean context. One of the main EU non-proliferation policy objectives, at least at rhetoric, is the creation of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, which could be subsequently expanded to whole Mediterranean. Nevertheless, at the same time EU members France (a Mediterranean country itself) and the UK, for the time being, do not show any indication of giving up their NWS status. This is actually one of the main reasons why the WMD-free zone in the Middle East, but not in the Mediterranean, is on the European and international agenda.

One popular way to measure consistency on specific issue areas is to look at the voting behaviour of the member states at the UNGA. Kienzie’s (2008, p. 254) findings illustrate that, despite the improvements on general voting cohesion at the UNGA, the EU member states are still far from voting in unity in the field of non-proliferation even with regard to the issues related to effective multilateralism, which forms the backbone of EU’s non-proliferation policy. No doubt, this is an inevitable outcome of the consistency problem stemming from the aforementioned natural divisions between members. However, it is worth mentioning that the EU has reached a flawless coherence with regard to its member’s being party to the basic non-proliferation treaties. Thus, in line with its non-proliferation objectives, the EU made promotion of the universal ratification of, and adherence to, the relevant multilateral instruments core of its non-proliferation policy, also in the Mediterranean.

e) Availability of policy instruments and concrete actions

The EU WMD Strategy states that the “EU must make use of all its instruments to prevent, deter, halt, and if possible eliminate proliferation programmes that cause concern at global level.” This strong commitment in rhetoric implies that the EU has instruments available to achieve these challenging objectives. The Strategy classifies the available instruments as follows: “multilateral treaties and verification mechanisms; national and internationally-coordinated export controls; cooperative threat reduction programmes; political and economic levers (including trade and development policies); interdiction of illegal procurement activities and, as a last resort, coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter.” Hence, as was stated above, “effective multilateralism” is put to the “cornerstone” of the Strategy and coercive measures are left as means of last resort and exclusively restricted to a UN mandate. The

report actually leaves in doubt how the EU would deter or eliminate proliferation programmes of global concern.

With regard to the Mediterranean region, the objectives of “promotion of the signature and ratification by Mediterranean partners of all non-proliferation instruments, including the NPT, CWC, BWC and CTBT, and pursuing a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass-destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems” had already been mentioned in EU’s Common Strategy on the Mediterranean of 2000 (European Council, 2000). One of the main legal instruments of the EU in relation with these objectives is the “Council Common Position (2003/805/CFSP) of 17 November 2003 on the universalization and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non-proliferation and means of delivery^[25]” which entrusts the EU and the members to focus their diplomatic action on the pursuance of the objectives referred. Following the adoption of the EU WMD Strategy in December 2003, up until December 2010, twice a year, the six-monthly progress reports (in total 14) on the implementation of the Strategy have been adopted (Council of the EU, 2005; 2006a; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2008a; 2008b; 2009a; 2009b; 2010a; 2010c).

The progress reports^[26] demonstrate that, the decision (Council of the EU, 2003d) of mainstreaming non-proliferation policies into the EU’s wider relations with third countries have so far been the politically most visible instrument in the field developed by the EU. The 2004 Final Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East highlighted the non-proliferation clause as one of the main instruments for the EU to meet its objectives in the field. The EU has succeeded in inserting non-proliferation clause or provisions that contain the language based on key elements of the non-proliferation clause into the bilaterally adopted documents with the southern Mediterranean countries, except for Algeria, Syria and Libya. Nevertheless only with Syria an agreement with the real non-proliferation clause^[27] has been negotiated with success. Taking into account that Syria is one of the most problematic countries in the region in terms of non-proliferation this is an important success for the EU. However, the signature and entry into force of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with Syria (European Commission, 2008b), negotiations of which was completed in 2004, is still pending. In case of Libya, the reports state that a Framework Agreement (since Libya is not a member of the EMP, no Association Agreement has ever been on the bilateral agenda) has been negotiated since 2009 and parties have so far agreed to include a WMD non-proliferation clause into this agreement. The Association Agreement with Algeria was signed prior to EU’s decision on non-proliferation clause and does not include any reference to non-proliferation issues. An Action Plan with Algeria has not yet included in the bilateral agenda. A significant success for the EU is that ENP Action Plans, which contain provisions with the language of the WMD non-proliferation clause, have been adopted with all other southern Mediterranean countries, including the tough cases of Israel and Egypt. The EU-Israel Action Plan^[28], which was adopted in April 2005, includes a “lighter” and nuanced version of the non-proliferation clause in comparison with those adopted with other countries of the region. The EU-Israel Action Plan text focuses more on cooperation on the non-proliferation of WMD with a particular emphasis on terrorism-WMD nexus, preventing illicit trafficking of WMD-related material, non-state actors and cooperation on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540. Not surprisingly, Israel only “considers” “the promotion of adherence, implementation, accession and strengthening of other relevant international instruments, export control regimes or regional arrangements”. Another important dimension of the EU-Israel Action Plan is that it does not involve a single reference to disarmament. The EU-Egypt Action Plan^[29], on the other hand,

highlights disarmament and Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, while also focusing on terrorism-WMD nexus. Like Israel, Egypt solely “considers” “promoting the accession to and implementation of other relevant international instrument”. The Action Plans with other countries of the region also contain references to cooperation on non-proliferation (See: Table 4 for the status of EU WMD non-proliferation clause in relations with the southern Mediterranean countries).

Table 4. EU WMD non-proliferation clause in relations with southern Mediterranean countries

| Country | Existence of WMD non-proliferation clause |
|-----------|--|
| Algeria | No Agreement signed that may include the WMD clause. No Action Plan adopted. |
| Egypt | No Agreement signed that may include the WMD clause. Action Plan contain WMD chapter. |
| Israel | No Agreement signed that may include the WMD clause. Action Plan contain WMD chapter. |
| Jordan | No Agreement signed that may include the WMD clause. Action Plan contain WMD chapter. |
| Lebanon | No Agreement signed that may include the WMD clause. Action Plan contain WMD chapter |
| Libya | Negotiations on a Framework Agreement with the WMD clause are ongoing. |
| Morocco | No Agreement signed that may include the WMD clause. Action Plan contain WMD chapter |
| Syria | Negotiations on a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with the WMD clause are concluded. Signature and entry into force of the agreement are pending. |
| Tunisia | No Agreement signed that may include the WMD clause. Action Plan contain WMD chapter |
| Palestine | No Agreement signed that may include the WMD clause. Action Plan contain WMD chapter |

Source: Own illustration built on the table prepared by Kienzle (2008, p. 212) and based on the data/information available in the six-monthly progress reports on the implementation of the EU WMD Strategy.

The other instruments used by the EU and the concrete actions are mostly about technical and financial assistance provided through the projects conducted by international non-proliferation organizations, such as the IAEA. Reports basically illustrate that the EU has provided funds and support for IAEA assistance projects realized in the Mediterranean region. The EU has supported projects that aim “strengthening of security of radioactive materials in non-nuclear applications”, “strengthening of states’ capabilities for detection and response to illicit trafficking”, “strengthening the security and control of nuclear and other radioactive materials”. Also several Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) have been among the beneficiaries of the Council Joint Action in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO). The EU has availed itself of the Instrument for Stability and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation for its actions in the region. According to the reports, the EU also supports regional projects in the Mediterranean region, such as the

EpiSouth project, which aims at decreasing health and security threats and other bio-security risks. Moreover, the reports illustrate that EU is active in organizing seminars, workshops and other activities alike with a view to supporting universalization of the non-proliferation treaties and also in support of the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1540. The EU also provides export control training and assistance for states in need of technical knowledge (Such assistance has so far provided for Morocco in the region).

The reports also indicate that the EU, through its joint actions, supports universalization of the key non-proliferation treaties and issue statements/declarations to this end, and makes demarches including the countries of the Mediterranean region. Taking up issues of non-proliferation in the context of political dialogues is another instrument utilized by the EU. The reports indicate that an intensive dialogue has taken place with Egypt both formally (political dialogue in the context of the Barcelona Process) and also informally through contacts of the Personal Representative on non-proliferation ahead of the NPT Review Conference of 2010. June 2010 Report states that “the PSC endorsed in December 2009 the establishment of a regular political dialogue with Egypt on non-proliferation and disarmament issues and the first meeting with Egypt at CONOP-CODUN level was held in Brussels on 17 February 2010 focusing on preparations for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.”

Moreover, the EU officials (primarily the Personal Representative) and the representatives of the member states have raised issues of non-proliferation in their contacts with the concerned countries. Personal Representative paid visits to the region, such as the July 2004 visit in cooperation with the Presidency and the European Commission for a workshop on non-proliferation in the context of the security chapter of the Barcelona Process (Council of the EU, 2005). As was already illustrated earlier, the multilateral framework of Mediterranean cooperation has not served as an effective forum on non-proliferation issues. Nevertheless, the EU tried to make use of the Barcelona Process with little, if any, success, with a view to organising workshops/seminars/meetings on non-proliferation.

In sum, inserting provisions/chapters on non-proliferation to the ENP Action Plans have so far been the most visible and politically successful action taken by the EU in the region. Although no real non-proliferation clause has yet been inserted to any agreement between the EU and the countries of the region, all existing ENP Action Plans contain references to non-proliferation issues. Furthermore, negotiations with Syria on an Association Agreement with WMD non-proliferation clause have been concluded and negotiations with Libya on a Framework Agreement with such a clause are on-going. Apart from the non-proliferation clause, the overall analysis of the six-monthly progress reports show that, although the proliferation in the region, a potential of a WMD race (particularly in the Middle East), and non-state actor dimension of the proliferation highly concern the EU, the instruments used by the EU and the concrete actions remained rather limited to technical and financial assistance provided through the projects conducted by international non-proliferation instruments.

Conclusion

Krotz (2009, p. 557) argues that “a real autonomous political actorhood for the EU in the areas of traditional high politics requires steady and dependable capacity to act in the policy domains related to the use of force or coercion, the preparation for the use of force, the threat of the use of force or the preparation for the possible threat of the use of force or coercion, common

policies on these issues and ability to hold together in stormy political times and on matters of the highest stakes". Dryburgh (2008), on the other hand, claims that EU is a global actor thanks to the CFSP, after examining a specific case (EU policy towards Iran) where he claims the EU has developed an active presence and policy. Fully accepting Krotz' argument would lead to a highly sceptical conclusion on EU's "actorness" in international relations, particularly on matters covered by the CFSP. In contrast, concurring with Dryburgh's hypothesis, which draws such a general conclusion from a single case study, would distract one from truly assessing the reality and lead to a wishful thinking.

In between these suggestions, and within the context of a broadly used rhetoric that the EU is a global actor, this paper aimed at examining EU "actorness" in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, with a special emphasis placed on the southern Mediterranean region. The objective has not been, as indicated in the introductory chapter, to draw general conclusions on EU's non-proliferation policy based on a single case. To the contrary, the purpose of this paper has been to provide an objective and comprehensive analysis on a selected issue area and case, since even in the same field but in different cases this analysis would have reached to contradicting conclusions. For instance, while the EU can be regarded as an active actor in the Iranian nuclear crisis, its non-proliferation "actorness" has remained limited towards the southern Mediterranean. First, it is not the sole existence of the CFSP or other instruments and policies that make the EU an actor with global concerns and interests. Second, it is not the anarchic international system or the non-existence of a unified Europe that would supposedly explain EU's limited "actorness".

The analysis of the external context has demonstrated that regional conflicts has served as the main and constant constraint that limited EU's non-proliferation "actorness" in the southern Mediterranean. De Vasconcelos (2010) correctly concludes that "The EU's Mediterranean policy (with all its aspects) has remained, in spite of intense efforts to the contrary, largely hostage to the (Middle East) conflict, and its objective of creating a multilateral framework for cooperation in the Mediterranean including Israel as well as Arab states cannot be met." In this context, one should not expect the EU to become an effective non-proliferation actor in the region until some progress is achieved with regard to the deep-rooted and complex problems of the Middle East.

On the institutional side, this study has illustrated that, EU's foreign policy apparatus, including its non-proliferation dimension, has reached a quite advanced level, despite its deficiencies. Furthermore, the EU has tried to establish multilateral and bilateral institutional platforms where non-proliferation issues were among the agenda. The multilateral frameworks, namely the EMP and the subsequent UfM, have so far remained definitely ineffective on political agenda, including non-proliferation issues. However, the bilateral framework, the ENP, has led to the most visible instrument of the EU; that is the insertion of non-proliferation chapters into the ENP Action Plans.

This research has found that EU's self-presentation on non-proliferation issues in the southern Mediterranean has remained weak and reluctant, particularly in the sense that no concrete problem or country is explicitly mentioned in EU's strategic documents. The EU rather defined the general problems in the region and highlighted the importance of increasing the number of states in the region that are party to relevant international non-proliferation documents. This approach is in consistency with the priority given by the EU to effective multilateralism. On the other hand, bilaterally negotiated and adopted documents in the region have revealed that,

almost all countries of the region, including Israel, Egypt and Syria, have accepted to enter into a non-proliferation dialogue with the EU. Thus, they perceive the EU in a way or another as a non-proliferation actor in the region, but not to an extent to change their policies in line with EU's expectations. However, since the adoption of EU WMD Strategy in 2003 and insertion of WMD non-proliferation chapters into the ENP Action Plans, some progress in universalization of international non-proliferation instruments has achieved. Although it is quite difficult to measure EU's impact, since 2003, some countries of the region signed and ratified some key documents (Tunisia ratified CTBT in 2004 and signed IAEA AP in 2005; Morocco signed IAEA AP in 2004; Lebanon ratified both CTBT and CWC in 2008).

With regard to consistency, the study came to the conclusion that, natural divisions within the EU ("NATO member vs. non-NATO member", "NWS vs. NNWS" and "EU members with civilian nuclear industry vs. ones with no civilian nuclear industry") provide one of the main constraints for EU's non-proliferation policy, in general. These natural divisions have also been reflected in the voting records of the UN. One assumption of this study is that EU's non-proliferation policy objective of supporting a WMD-free zone in the Middle East has inconsistencies in itself, while two EU members, one of which is a Mediterranean country itself (France) are NWS.

Finally the paper analyzed the available instruments and concrete actions of the EU in the field. Since the adoption of the EU WMD Strategy, the only politically visible action successfully taken by the EU in the region has been the insertion of WMD non-proliferation clauses/chapters to bilateral agreements and ENP Action Plans, even though no agreement with non-proliferation clause has yet been signed. It is worth noting that the EU has adopted both with Israel and with Egypt such Action Plans. However, apart from the non-proliferation clause, the instruments utilized by the EU have remained mostly technical and financial, such as supporting projects conducted by international non-proliferation organizations.

None of these conclusions would allow drawing any general conclusions either on EU foreign policy in general or on the non-proliferation policy of the Union in particular. The only and expected conclusion has been that EU "actorness" on non-proliferation of WMD in the southern Mediterranean has remained limited for a variety of reasons. In spite of this, the EU has still been active in some aspects of non-proliferation problem in the region.

Notes

[1] The term European Union (EU) will be used in this paper independent from the historical evolution of the European integration, thus, may refer to the European Communities when applicable. In accordance with this approach, the term European Commission is used also to refer to the Commission of the European Communities.

[2] There are doubts whether in English the term "actorness" exists. This notion is peculiar to studies on EU's foreign policy and conceptualized by Bretherton and Vogler (2006). Thus, it will always be used between quotation marks throughout this paper.

[3] These countries are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia. Except for Libya, these are the Mediterranean partner countries (non EU members/candidates and non NATO members/partners) that have participated in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. EU's non proliferation policy towards Palestine will be taken into consideration where applicable.

[4] Actors not concerning this study are deducted from the original Table. Table is updated, when necessary, based on the Report prepared by the US State Department (Department of State of the USA, 2010).

[5] For a short analysis on Israel's threat perception and its deterrence policy, see Spyer, J. (2008). For an argument that Israel's deterrence policy has not worked, see: Wilson, W. (2008).

[6] http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6723895.ece "Once a pariah, Muammar Gaddafi has become an ally against terrorism" (accessed on 20 April 2011).

[7] <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/02/23/134004967/the-enigma-of-gadhafi-a-pariah-once-again> "The Enigma Of Gadhafi, A Pariah Once Again" (accessed on 20 April 2011).

[8] While this paper was being finalized, the anti-regime uprising in Libya which started in February 2011 (and since March backed by NATO operation on the basis of the UNSC Resolution 1973 - <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/71679.htm>) was very close to topple Gadhafi. Since the onset of the uprising, some concerns have arisen over whether the Gadhafi regime would resort to the remaining chemical warfare materials and short range Scud missiles against the rebels and civilians. On 24th August 2011, Pentagon spokesman Col. Dave Lapan, answering a question, confirmed that "known missile and chemical agent storage facilities remain secure." (Source: http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110825_7054.php - accessed on 31 August 2011).

[9] For a comprehensive and updated analysis of the status of international and regional treaties on non-proliferation in the Middle East, see: Santoro, D. (2011), *"Status of non-proliferation treaties, agreements, and other related instruments in the Middle East"*, Background paper, EU Seminar to promote confidence building and in support of a process aimed at establishing a zone free of WMD and means of delivery in the Middle East, Brussels, 6–7 July.

[10] For further reading on EU's involvement in the Middle East question, see: Bulut Aymat, E. (Ed.) (2010), *"European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict"*, Chaillot Papers 124, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, December.

[11] The Conclusions of the European Councils in Lisbon (June 1992), at Corfu (June 1994), in Essen (December 2004) are available respectively at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lisbon/default_en.htm;
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00150.en4.htm;
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00300-1.en4.htm (all accessed on 4 August 2011)

[12] Barcelona Conference of 27 and 28 November 1995 brought together the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 15 EU Member States and 12 Mediterranean non-member countries. The Final Declaration of the Conference (Barcelona Declaration) established the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which later in Paris Summit of July 2008 transformed into the Union for the Mediterranean with its Permanent Secretariat located in Barcelona – Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm - accessed on 15 July 2011.

[13] For further reading on WMD-free zone in the Middle East, see: Müller and Baumgart-Ochse (2011), in which they suggest that given the current situation in the Middle East (Iran's position towards Israel's existence, Israel's deterrence policy, and other actors' ambitions to acquire other types of WMD etc.), a WMD-free sounds utopia for the time being.

[14] For further reading on Libya's decision to dismantle its WMD, see: Hochman, D. (2006), Jentleson, B. W. (2005) and Salama, S. (2004).

[15] The EEAS has been officially established by the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service", 2010/427/EU.

[16] "The EU Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), which was established in 2002, monitors and assesses events and situations world-wide on a 24-hour basis with a focus on potential crisis regions, terrorism and WMD proliferation." (Cross, M. K. D., 2011).

[17] Press Statement dated 26 July 2010 – available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/genaff/115960.pdf (accessed on 8 August 2011).

[18] The new UfM process improves the institutional set-up of the EMP and introduces new structures, such as a permanent Secretariat, which is based in Barcelona. However, the mandate of the UfM Secretariat is of technical character with a particular focus on projects in the fields of SME financing, maritime transport, renewable energies, water and environment, social affairs and civil protection, and higher education. Dialogue on political issues is exclusively restricted to Senior Officials Meetings, or higher level political meetings (Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Summits). For further reading on the UFM, See: Aliboni, R. and Ammor, F. M. (2009); Aliboni, R. (2009) and Johansson-Nogues, E. (2011).

[19] Both the Summit meeting, which was planned twice to be held in Barcelona (one for June 2010 and the other for November 2010) and the Foreign Ministers meeting (which was planned for November 2009 to be held in Istanbul) have been postponed due to the situation in the Middle East. One main, if not only, reason behind these postponements was Arab countries' boycotting of Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman's participation to these meetings (<http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/05/union-for-the-mediterranean-summit-postponed/68043.aspx>; <http://www.ejpress.org/article/47300>; <http://www.haaretz.com/news/med-union-summit-at-risk-over-egypt-boycott-of-lieberman-1.6056>) (all accessed on 7 August 2011).

[20] For further reading on the discussions on reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty on EU foreign policy decision making process, see: Best, E. (2008) and Wessels, W. and Bopp, F. (2008).

[21] The concerned ENP documents can be accessed through the EEAS-EuroMed Web Page: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm.

[22] The text of the Association Agreement with Syria is available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/syria/docs/index_en.htm - accessed on 9 August 2011.

[23] As Nuttal (2005) points out, consistency and coherence are two terms with same meaning and distinguishing between them would only lead to a "*linguistic pedantry*". For an in depth discussion on "consistency" within the context of EU foreign policy making, See: Nuttal, S. (2005).

[24] "New Agenda Coalition (NAC) - New Zealand, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, and Sweden. The New Agenda Coalition was established in 1998, concerned by the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament efforts in the aftermath of the Nuclear Non proliferation Treaty's indefinite extension and at the implications of India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests, the group sought to inject fresh thinking and a new momentum into multilateral consideration of the issues." Source: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade - <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/Disarmament/0--Nuclear/0-new-agenda-coalition.php> - accessed on 14 August 2011.

[25] This Common Position is not focusing on the Mediterranean region, but a general instrument which set the objectives and actions to be taken by the EU and members for supporting universalization of relevant international instruments, such as the NPT, IAEA Additional Protocols, CWC, BWC, HCoC and CTBT.

[26] All information provided in the remaining parts of this section is based, if not stated otherwise, on the six-monthly reports on the implementation of the EU WMD Strategy until the end of 2010. They are all available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-policy/non-proliferation,-disarmament-and-export-control-/documentation/documents.aspx?lang=en#Bookmark4> – accessed on 10 June 2011.

[27] The principal character of the non-proliferation clause is that it is designed to be inserted into all agreements (modalities are provided in detail in Council's decision) to be concluded between the EU and third countries and the first part of this clause will form an essential element of the agreement; that is in cases of non-compliance, the agreement would be suspended as the option of last resort.

[28] The EU-Israel Action Plan is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/israel_enp_ap_final_en.pdf - accessed on 10 June 2011.

[29] The EU-Israel Action Plan is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/egypt_enp_ap_final_en.pdf - accessed on 10 June 2011.

List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---------|--|
| AP | Additional Protocol |
| BWC | Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Long form: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction) |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| CODUN | Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Control |
| CONOC | Working Group on Non-Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons |
| CONOP | Working Group on Non-Proliferation |
| CONUC | Working Groups on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |
| COREPER | Committee of Permanent Representatives |
| CSA | Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement |
| CTBT | Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty |
| CTBTO | Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization |
| CWC | Chemical Weapons Convention (Long form: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction) |
| DPRK | Democratic People's Republic of Korea |
| ECSC | European Coal and Steel Community |
| EEAS | European External Action Service |
| EMP | Euro-Mediterranean Partnership |
| ENP | European Neighbourhood Policy |
| EPC | European Political Cooperation |
| ESDP | European Security and Defence Policy |
| ESS | European Security Strategy |
| EU | European Union |
| EURATOM | European Atomic Energy Community |
| FPA | Foreign Policy Analysis |
| GICNT | Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism |
| HCoC | Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation |
| IAEA | International Atomic Energy Agency |
| ICSANT | International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism |

| | |
|------|--|
| IR | International Relations |
| KEDO | Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization |
| MTCR | Missile Technology Control Regime |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NPT | Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |
| NSG | Nuclear Suppliers Group |
| NSS | National Security Strategy |
| PSC | Political and Security Committee |
| PSI | Proliferation Security Initiative |
| TEU | Treaty on European Union |
| TFEU | Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| UfM | Union for the Mediterranean |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| WMD | Weapons of Mass Destruction |

References

- Ahlström, C. (2005) "The EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction", in S. N. Kile (ed.) *Europe and Iran: Perspectives on Non-Proliferation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Aliboni, R. (2009), "The Union for the Mediterranean Evolution and Prospects", Documenti IAI 09 - 39e, Istituto Affari Internazionali, December.
- Aliboni, R. and Ammor, F. M. (2009), "Under the Shadow of 'Barcelona': From the EMP to the Union for the Mediterranean", EuroMeSCo Paper 77, January.
- Álvarez-Verdugo, M. (2006) "Mixing Tools against Proliferation: The EU's Strategy for Dealing with Weapons of Mass Destruction", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 11, pp. 417-38.
- Andreatta, F. (2005), "Theory and the European Union's International Relations", in Hill, C. and Smith, M. (Eds), *International Relations and the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Balfour, R. (2004), "Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue", Occasional Papers No. 52, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, May.
- Barbé, E. (1995), (2007), *Relaciones Internacionales*, 3rd ed., Madrid: Tecnos.
- (2000), "La PESC: Desafíos Políticos y Límites Institucionales", in Barbé, E. (Ed.), *Política Exterior Europea*, Barcelona: Ariel, 107-128.
- Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P. (eds.) (2010), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 5th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Best, E. (2008), "The Lisbon Treaty: A Qualified Advance for EU Decision-Making and Governance", EIPASCOPE 2008/1.
- Biscop, S., Howorth, J. and Giegerich, B. (2009), "Europe: A Time for Strategy", Egmont Paper No. 27, Brussels, Royal Institute for International Relations.

- Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. (2006), *"The European Union as a Global Actor"* (2nd ed.), London: Routledge.
- Bull, H. (1982), "Civilian power Europe: a contradiction in terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 21:2, pp. 149-164.
- Bush, G. W. (2003), "President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom", President's Radio Address, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, 22 March (available at: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/print/20030322.html> - accessed on 29 July 2011).
- Carlsnaes, W. (2008), "Actors, Structures, and Foreign Policy Analysis", in Smith, S., Hadfield, A. and Dunne, T. (Eds.), *"Foreign Policy. Theories, actors, cases"*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cordesman, A. (2004), *"The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East"*, CSIS, Washington DC, 15 March.
- Cornish, P. and Edwards, G.. (2001), "Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture", *International Affairs*, 77:3, pp. 587-603.
- (2005), "The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report", *International Affairs*, 81:4, pp. 801-820.
- Council of the EU (2001), *Conclusions of the 2397th General Affairs Council meeting*, 15078/01 (Presse 460), Brussels, 10 December.
- (2002), *Conclusions of the 2421st General Affairs Council meeting*, 7705/02 (Presse 91), Luxembourg, 15 April.
- (2003a), *Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, 10352/03, Brussels, 10 June.
- (2003b), *Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, 10354/1/03, Brussels, 13 June.
- (2003c), *Declaration on Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, adopted at Thessaloniki European Council 19 and 20 June 2003, Presidency Conclusions, 11638/03, Brussels, 1 October.
- (2003d), *Fight against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction - Mainstreaming Non-Proliferation Policies into the EU's Wider Relations with Third Countries*, 14997/03, Brussels, 19 November.
- (2003e), *Council Common Position 2003/805/CFSP of 17 November 2003 on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery*, OJEU, L 302/34-36, 20 November.
- (2003f), *Fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, 15708/03, Brussels, 10 December.
- (2004), *Brussels European Council 12 and 13 December 2003 Presidency Conclusions*, 5381/04, Brussels, 5 February.
- (2005), *Progress Report on the implementation of Chapter III of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, 9898/05, Brussels, 8 June.
- (2006a), *Six-Monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2006/I)*, 10527/06, Brussels, 14 June.
- (2006b), *8th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Tampere, 27-28 November 2006) 'Tampere Conclusions'*, 15921/1/06 REV 1 (Presse 344), Brussels, 30 November .
- (2006c), *EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD: Monitoring and enhancing consistent implementation*, 16694/06, Brussels, 12 December.

- (2007a), *Six-Monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2006/II)*, 5183/07, Brussels. 7 January 2007.
 - (2007b), *Six-Monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2007/I)*, 11024/07, Brussels, 19 June.
 - (2007c), *Six-Monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2007/II)*, 16411/07, Brussels, 11 December.
 - (2008a), *Six-Monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2008/I)*, 10744/08, Brussels, 17 June.
 - (2008b), *Six-Monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2008/II)*, 17184/08, Brussels, 17 December.
 - (2008c), *Council Conclusions and new lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems*, 17172/08, Brussels, 17 December.
 - (2009a), *Six-Monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2009/I)*, 11490/09, Brussels, 26 June.
 - (2009b), *Six-Monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2009/II)*, 17387/09, Brussels, 9 December.
 - (2010a), *Six-Monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2008/I)*, 11135/10, Brussels, 14 June.
 - (2010b), *Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service*, 2010/427/EU, OJEU L201/30-40, 3 August.
 - (2010c), *Six-Monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2010/II)*, 17080/10, Brussels, 16 December.
- Cremona, M. (2004), "The Union as a Global Actor: Roles, Models and Identity", *Common Market Law Review*, 41, pp. 553-573.
- Cross, M. K. D., (2011), "EU Intelligence Sharing & The Joint Situation Centre: A Glass Half-Full", Prepared for delivery at the 2011 Meeting of the European Union Studies Association March 3-5, 2011, (available at: http://www.euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/3a_cross.pdf - accessed on 15 August 2011).
- De Vasconcelos, A. (2010), *Preface*, in Bulut Aymat, E. (Ed.) (2010), *European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Chaillot Papers 124, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, December.
- Del Sarto, R. A. Schumacher, T. (2005) "From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10, pp. 17-38.
- Department of State of the USA (2010), *Adherence to and compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments*, July (available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/145181.pdf> - accessed on 23 July 2011)
- Dryburgh, L. (2008), "The EU as a Global Actor? EU Policy Towards Iran", *European Security*, 17:2, pp. 235-271.
- Duchene, F. (1972), "Europe's Role in World Peace", in Mayne, R. (Ed.) *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*, London: Fontana/Collins.
- European Commission (2004), *Communication from the Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper*, COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May.

- (2008), *European Commission Proposal for a Council Decision on the signature on behalf of the European Community and provisional application of certain provisions of a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement between the European Community and its Member States and the Syrian Arab Republic; Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement between the European Community and its Member States of the one part, and the Syrian Arab Republic, of the other part (presented by the Commission)*, COM(2008) 853 final, Brussels, 12 December
- European Council (1980), *Venice European Council Declaration*, (available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf - accessed on 5 August 2011).
- (2000) *Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean Region*, 2000/458/CFSP, OJEU L183/5-10, 22 July.
- (2003), *European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World (2003)*, Approved by the Brussels European Council held on 12 December 2003 and drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative Javier SOLANA (available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> - accessed on 10 July 2011).
- (2004), *Final Report (approved by the European Council in June 2004) on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East*, Brussels, 17-18 June, available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Partnership%20Mediterranean%20and%20Middle%20East.pdf> - accessed on 1 August 2011).
- (2008), *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World*, Brussels, Approved by the Brussels European Council held on 11 and 12 December 2008 and drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative Javier SOLANA. (available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf - accessed on 20 June 2011).
- Fitzpatrick, M. (2011), "Nuclear capabilities in the Middle East", Background paper - EU Seminar to promote confidence building and in support of a process aimed at establishing a zone free of WMD and means of delivery in the Middle East, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium – The European Network of independent non-proliferation think tanks, Brussels, 6–7 July
- General Secretariat of the Council of the EU (2008), *The European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Effective multilateralism, prevention and international cooperation*, Brochure, November 2008.
- Ginsberg, R. (1999), "Conceptualising the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Capability-Expectations Gap", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37:3, pp. 429-454.
- González Alonso, L. N. (2008), "Quién dijo que desaparecen los pilares? La configuración jurídica de la acción exterior de la UE en el Tratado de Lisboa", Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, J.M., (coord.), *El Tratado de Lisboa. La Salida de la crisis constitucional*, AEPDRI, Iustel.
- Government of the United States (2002), *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, 17 September, (available at: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/> - accessed on 8 August 2011)
- Grand, C., (2000), *The European Union and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons*, Chaillot Papers 37, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, January
- Grip, L. (2011), *Mapping the European Union's Institutional Actors Related to WMD Non-Proliferation*, Non-Proliferation Papers No. 1, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium – The European Network of independent non-proliferation think tanks, May

- Hill, C. and Smith, M. (eds) (2005), *International Relations and the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Hochman, D. (2006), "Rehabilitating a Rogue: Libya's WMD Reversal and Lessons for US Policy", *Parameters*, Spring, p.63-78.
- Howorth, J. (2010), "The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48:3, pp. 455-474.
- International Atomic Energy Agency (2008), *Annual Report 2008*, GC(53)/7.
- (2010), *Annual Report 2010*, GC(55)/2.
- (2011a), *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic - Report by the Director General*, Board of Governors, GOV/2011/30, 24 May.
- (2011b), *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic - Resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 9 June 2011*, Board of Governors, GOV/2011/41, 9 June.
- Jentleson, B. W. (2005), "Who 'Won' Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy", *International Security*, 30:3, p.47-86.
- Johansson-Nogues, E. (2011), "The UfM's Institutional Structure: Making Inroads towards 'Co-Ownership'?", *Mediterranean Politics*, 16:1, pp. 21-38.
- Kagan, R. (2002), "Power and Weakness: Why the United States and Europe see the World Differently", *Policy Review*, 113 (available at <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/7107> on 11th June 2011 – accessed on 11 July 2011).
- Lesser, I. O. and Tellis, A. J. (1996), *Strategic Exposure – Proliferation Around the Mediterranean*, Rand Corp. Arroyo Center, Santa Monica (CA), 31 December.
- Keukeleire, S. and MacNaughtan, J. (2008), *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Kienzle, B. (2008), *Ideas, Interests and the Limits of Collective Foreign Policy Output: The Case of the European Union Non-Proliferation Policy*, Doctoral Dissertation, UAB
- Krotz, U. (2009), "Momentum and Impediments: Why Europe Won't Emerge as a Full Political Actor on the World Stage Soon", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47:3, pp. 555-578.
- Larsen, H. (2005), *Analysing the Foreign Policy of Small States in the EU*, London: Palgrave
- Lindstrom, G. and Schmitt, B., eds (2003) *Fighting Proliferation: European Perspectives*, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.
- Manners, I. (2002), "Normative Power Europe: Contradiction in Terms", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40:2, pp. 236-258.
- Manners, I. (2010), "Global Europa: Mythology of the European Union in World Politics", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48:1, pp. 67-87
- Meyer, C. O. (2004), *Theorising European Strategic Culture – Between Convergence and the Persistence of National Diversity*, CEPS Working Documents No. 204, June
- Müller, H. (2003) *Terrorism, Proliferation: A European Threat Assessment*, Chaillot Paper 58, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, March.
- (2007), "Europe and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction", in Foradori, P.; Rosa, P. Rosa and Scartezzini, R. (Eds) *Managing a Multilevel Foreign Policy: The EU in International Affairs*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Müller, H. and Baumgart-Ochse, C. (2011), *A weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East: an incremental approach*, Background paper - EU Seminar to promote confidence building and in support of a process aimed at establishing a zone free of WMD and means of delivery in the Middle East, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium – The European Network of independent non-proliferation think tanks, 6-7 July

- Nuttall, S. (2005), "Coherence and Consistency", in Hill, C. and Smith, M. (Eds) *International Relations and the European Union*, The New European Union Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pazarci, H. (2003), "*Uluslararası Hukuk*", Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi
- Piening, C. (1997), *Global Europe: The European Union in world affairs*, Boulder, CO/London: Lynne Rienner.
- Pijpers, A. (1988), "The Twelve Out-of-Area: A Civilian Power in an Uncivil World", in Pijpers, A., Regelsberger, E., Wessels, W. and Edwards, G. (Eds.), *European Political Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?*, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Portela, C. (2003), *The Role of the EU in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The Way to Thessaloniki and Beyond*, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt Reports No. 65
- Record, J. (2003), *The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq*, US Army War College Quarterly, Spring 2003, pp. 4-21.
- Rynning, S. (2007), "Peripheral or Powerful? The European Union's Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", *European Security*, 16:3, pp. 267-268.
- Santoro, D. (2011), *Status of non-proliferation treaties, agreements, and other related instruments in the Middle East*, Background paper - EU Seminar to promote confidence building and in support of a process aimed at establishing a zone free of WMD and means of delivery in the Middle East, Brussels, 6-7 July.
- Sauer, T. (2003), *How "common" is European nuclear non-proliferation policy?*, Paper presented at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), Edinburgh, 28th of March-2d of April 2003, (available at: <http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/edinburgh/ws12/Tom%20Sauer.pdf> - accessed on 5 August 2011)
- (2004), "The "Americanization" of EU nuclear non-proliferation policy", *Defense&Security Analysis*, 20:2, pp. 113-131.
- (2008) "Struggling on the World Scene: An Over-ambitious EU versus a Committed Iran", *European Security*, 17, pp. 273-93.
- Salama, S. (2004), *Was Libyan WMD Disarmament a Significant Success for Nonproliferation?*, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) - Monterey Institute of International Studies, September (available at: http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_56a.html - accessed on 18 August 2011).
- Solana, J. (2009a), "*Europe in the World*", Speech at Harvard University Kennedy School, 17 September (available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/110218.pdf - accessed on 5 June 2011).
- (2009b), "EU Making the World Safer", *The Japan Times*, 10 October (available at <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ea20091010a1.html> - accessed on 5 June 2011)
- Smith, H. (2002), *European Union Foreign Policy: What It Is and What It Does*, London: Pluto Press
- Smith, K.E. (2000), "The End of Civilian Power Europe: A Welcome Demise or a Cause of Concern?", *International Spectator*, 35:2, pp. 11-28.
- (2008), *European union foreign policy in a changing world* (2nd ed.), Cambridge: Polity Press
- Smith, M. E. (2004), "Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation", *European Journal of International Relations*, pp. 10:1, 95-136.
- Spyer, J. (2008), "Israel in the Middle East: Threats and Countermeasures", *International Relations*, 22, pp. 349-352

- Tertrais, B. (2003), "Europe and Nuclear Proliferation", in G. Lindstrom and B. Schmitt (eds) *Fighting Proliferation: European Perspectives*, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.
- Waltz, K.N. (2000), "Structural Realism After the Cold War", *International Security*, 25:1, 5-41
- Wessels, W. and Bopp, F. (2008), *The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty - Constitutional breakthrough or challenges ahead?*, Research Paper No. 10, Challenge, Liberty and Security, June (available at: http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/The_Institutional_Architecture_of_CFSP_after_the_Lisbon_Treaty.pdf - accessed on 20 August 2011).
- Wilson, W. (2008), "The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence", *Nonproliferation Review* (available at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policy/PDFs/153_wilson%5B1%5D.pdf - accessed on 7 August 2011).
- Union for the Mediterranean (2008a), *Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean*, Paris, 13 July (available at http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/ufm_paris_declaration1.pdf - accessed on 15 July 2011).
- (2008b), *Final Statement Marseille*, 3-4 November (available at <http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/dec-final-Marseille-UfM.pdf> - accessed on 15 July 2011).
- United Nations Security Council (2004a), *Resolution 1540 (Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction)*, S/RES/1540 (2004), New York, 28 April 2004.
- (2004b), *Letter Dated 28 October 2004 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations Addressed to the Chairman of the Committee. United Nations Security Council*, S/AC.44/2004/(02)/48, Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), 15 November.
- Zielonka, J. (1998), *Explaining Euro-Paralysis: Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics*, London: Routledge.